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Ludwik Fleck’s Scientism 
Markus Seidel, University of Münster 
 
In a recent paper in Social Epistemology Dimitri Ginev aims to show that Ludwik Fleck 
uses transcendental arguments in two contexts in his work that are closely intertwined: 
the context of comparative cognitive sociology and the context of socio-historical 
epistemology (Ginev 2015, 3-4). I am skeptical about Ginev’s interpretation and my aim 
is to show that at least the part of Ginev’s argument in which he aims to show Fleck’s use 
of transcendental arguments in the context of socio-historical epistemology is not 
convincing. To my mind, a much better interpretation of Fleck’s argument in this context 
is to see Fleck as using scientistic instead of transcendental arguments. Since my 
argument will be based on a much closer reading of Fleck’s wording than is provided by 
Ginev, I can only focus on a very short passage in Ginev’s paper and will not discuss the 
paper as a whole. 
 
Ginev’s Interpretation of Fleck’s ‘Science and Environment’ 
 
In order to show that Fleck’s argument is scientistic instead of transcendental, I will focus 
on Ginev’s interpretation of Fleck’s argument for the “prevention of science from 
political distortion” (Ginev 2015, 4). Especially in his paper Science and Environment1 
Fleck aims to demarcate his own position concerning the influence of the environment on 
science from propagandistic receptions of his theory especially by Nazi-authors. As 
Ginev rightly claims, Fleck argues against “the politically motivated externalism about 
the formation of science’s cognitive content” (Ginev 2015, 4). However, I am skeptical 
about Ginev’s interpretation of Fleck’s argument at this point.  
 
According to Ginev, Fleck argues that the thought-styles of scientific communities 
provide some kind of cognitive barrier against the intrusion of politically motivated, 
external manipulations:  
 
The whole process of research runs within (what Fleck calls) the 
‘collective mood of cognition’ (kollektive Erkenntnisstimmung). Being 
implicated in practices that are in a complicated fashion entangled with 
this mood, a thought collective is critical towards accepting aims and 
values that are imposed externally, and are not inaugurated by 
community’s thought style. Thus, a thought style armors a scientific 
community with resources for resisting the external ideological and 
political manipulations (Ginev 2015, 4).  
 
It is at this point, Ginev claims, that Fleck uses transcendental arguments: these are used 
by Fleck to specify “the conditions under which a thought style warrants the cognitive 
autonomy in the constitution of facts and objects of inquiry” (Ginev 2015, 5). 
 
                                            
1 Polish original: “Nauka a środowisko”. Like Ginev, I will refer to the German translation “Wissenschaft 
und Umwelt” (Fleck [1939] 2011a) from which I translated the quoted passages into English. 
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Now, I admit that it is possible to interpret Fleck’s resistance against the ideological 
intrusions of science along the lines of such a cognitive barrier against ideas foreign to 
specific thought-styles. As Ginev rightly observes (see Ginev 2015, 5), Fleck describes 
the thought-style of the natural sciences to be democratic in the following sense:  
 
If the masses occupy a stronger position, a democratic tendency will be 
impressed upon this relation [between esoteric and exoteric circles; M.S.]. 
The elite panders, as it were, to public opinion and strives to preserve the 
confidence of the masses. This is the situation in which the thought 
collective of science usually finds itself today (Fleck 1979, 105).  
 
Now, it might be argued, this role of the masses in relation to the elite of the natural-
scientific thought-collective—together with the general tenacity of systems of opinion2—
hinders the intrusion of non-democratic, politically external ideas. Note, however, that 
this interpretation has the following problem: since, as Fleck claims, the elite panders to 
public opinion the esoteric circle is strongly dependent on opinions and factors that are 
external to it and that are part of the exoteric circle. How, so it has to be asked, is it 
possible for Fleck to claim that the natural-scientific thought-collective can provide a 
cognitive barrier against the intrusion of political ideologies on this interpretation? Isn’t 
the thought-collective with its “dominance of the mass over the elite” (Fleck 1979, 124) 
much more prone to external political intrusion than e.g. religious thought-collectives in 
which “the elite enjoys the stronger position, [such that] it will endeavor to maintain 
distance and to isolate itself from the crowd” (Fleck 1979, 105f.)? 
 
To my mind, because of these interpretative problems Ginev’s idea to interpret Fleck’s 
resistance against the intrusion of politically external factors on science by focusing on a 
kind of thought-style immanent cognitive barrier is not convincing. Moreover, it is 
surprising that Ginev does not take into account the argument Fleck himself uses in 
Science and Environment but proposes a quite remote interpretation from Fleck’s 
concrete wording.3 There is an alternative interpretation that fits much more neatly with 
Fleck’s overall project and with his wording in Science and Environment: it is to interpret 
Fleck’s argument not as transcendental argument but as scientistic argument. I will start 
by focusing on Fleck’s overall project to inaugurate a scientific, comparative 
epistemology and afterwards have a close look on Fleck’s argument in Science and 
Environment. 
 
Fleck’s Scientism and His Philosophy of Science 
 
Since Ginev in another paper in Social Epistemology also treats the issue of scientism4 
and since the label ‘scientism’ is used for a whole bunch of different theses and positions5 
let me make clear right from the start of my argument what I mean by ‘scientism’ in 
                                            
2 See Fleck 1979, 27: „Once a structurally complete and closed system of opinions consisting of many 
details and relations has been formed, it offers enduring resistance to anything that contradicts it”. 
3 The only reference at this point of Ginev’s interpretation is the rather broad remark „Fleck 2011, 329-
331“. 
4 See Ginev 2013. 
5 See Stenmark 1997. 
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Fleck’s work: I will refer to Fleck’s thesis—to be found all over his work6—that 
reflections on science should no longer be speculative or metaphysical but itself scientific 
and based on empirical investigations: “There is therefore no raison d’être for any 
speculative epistemology, even if it be regarded as a deduction from several examples. A 
great deal still remains to be investigated empirically and discovered about the process of 
cognition.” (Fleck 1979, 11). For Fleck, epistemology can only become a science if it 
becomes a comparative science and “[e]pistemology thus understood is a science of 
thought-styles” (Fleck 1986a, 98). This science aims to find out the historical and 
sociological laws at work in the genesis and development of thought-styles (see e.g. 
Fleck 1979, 9 and 23). For Fleck, such a scientific, comparative epistemology has a 
deliberating effect (see Fleck [1937] 2011, 326). Intracollectively, thought constraints 
cannot be dispersed.  
 
To the unsophisticated research worker limited by his own thought style, 
any alien thought style appears like a free flight of fancy, because he can 
see only that which is active and almost arbitrary about it.  His own 
thought style, in contrast, appears imperative to him, because although he 
is conscious of his own passivity, he takes his own activity for granted. It 
becomes natural and, like breathing, almost unconscious, as a result of 
education and training as well as through his participation in the 
communication of thoughts within the collective  (Fleck 1979, 141).  
 
However, according to Fleck, there is a possibility to become conscious also of the active 
elements in one’s own thinking:  
 
In cognition this [resistance, M.S.] appears as the connection between 
phenomena which can never be severed within the collective […]. This 
linkage seems to be truth and conditioned only by logic and content. Only 
an investigation in comparative epistemology, or a simple comparison 
after a change has occurred in the thought style, can make these inevitable 
connections accessible to scientific treatment (Fleck 1979, 101).  
 
What is important in this context is that Fleck’s scientism is for him not preferable 
because he finally—and self-contradictory—believes that such a scientific, comparative 
epistemology can be some kind of Über-Science that is free from sociological and 
historical factors and therefore can reveal the truth. In a remarkable passage in a reply to 
Izydora Dambska he gives the following description of “the content and value of the 
science of thought-styles” (Fleck [1937] 2011a, 325):  
 
It is impossible to examine views independently of the whole culture of a 
given society in a specific epoch. The starting point must be a community 
                                            
6 Let me just mention the places in his monograph Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact where 
Fleck demands a science of knowledge and a scientific epistemology that should empirically detect 
historical and sociological laws: Fleck 1979, 9, 11, 22, 23, 50, 51, 76.  I do not think it is necessary to point 
to all places in Fleck’s work in which he emphasizes that his aim is to build a science of cognition instead 
of a speculative theory of knowledge: let me just refer to the articles of Zittel and myself in which many 
more places are mentioned (see Zittel 2010, Seidel 2011). 
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of people living together and such a method above all leads to a sociology 
of thinking that covers the most general opinions because it can be a 
comparative science. In the epoch we are approaching, the epoch of 
synthesis and of the vanishing of particularisms, it will be unavoidable. 
The specialisation and the differentiation within the society is growing 
and is going on to grow. It is out of question that the brutal attempts to 
bring the people into line cannot be lasting and permanent. Understanding 
is possible only on the basis of the comparative method: the common 
thought collective, free by criticism and general by tolerance, is created 
only in this way  (Fleck [1937] 2011a, 324f).  
 
Fleck’s overly optimistic view can therefore be summarized as follows: a scientific, 
comparative epistemology can provide us with a more comprehensive view and lead to a 
common thought collective that is free by criticism and general by tolerance. And such a 
scientific investigation is also the best means to combat the brutal attempts to bring the 
people into line. Since Ginev in the abstract of his paper also says that he aims to discuss 
Fleck’s “political agenda regarding science’s ‘cultural mission’” (Ginev 2015, 1), but 
unfortunately only takes up Fleck’s use of the terms “cultural mission” and “cultural 
role” in one short footnote let me emphasize at this point that it is in exactly this context 
of describing the deliberating, political role of a scientific epistemology that Fleck—in 
his early writings7—uses these terms:  
 
If [the theory of thought-styles] will overthrow only that evil spell of 
doggedness with which fanatics of their own style fight the people of a 
different style, its cultural role will be found to be of high value. If it only 
uncovers the mechanism of action of each bit of propaganda, it will 
already immunize us against an absolute submission to propaganda: it will 
teach that man stands above the idea, because he is the idea’s creator  
(Fleck 1986a, 112).8 
 
Let me now apply Fleck’s plea for a scientific, comparative epistemology to interpret his 
view on the resistance of science against political intrusion in Science and Environment 
by having a more careful look at the exact wording in this article than Ginev and thereby 
undermining his argument for the interpretation of Fleck using transcendental arguments. 
After listing several authors as testimony for growing awareness of the dependence of 
                                            
7 I admit that in his paper from 1960 Crisis in Science, Fleck uses the term „cultural mission“ roughly along 
the lines that I think Ginev has in mind: an external, political and economical intrusion on science 
contradicts science’s cultural mission (see Fleck 1986b, 153). It should, however, also be noted that it is in 
exactly this text that Fleck probably makes the most scientistic statement in all of his texts: “Sociology of 
thinking should be developed as a fundamental science equal in its value to mathematics.” (Fleck 1986b, 
156) and then goes on to explain how this science can help scientists to guard against political intrusion: 
“The scientists ignore—at least officially—this matter and become victims of it. An open-eyed attitude to 
propaganda will make the subject resistant to its abuse: when every school child learns that any folly, no 
matter how big, may be made credible by proper propaganda—a critical resistance to propaganda will rise” 
(Fleck 1986b, 157). Thus, also in his later work Fleck draws on his scientism to argue against the political 
intrusion of science. 
8 Note that therefore in Fleck’s work science itself as well as the comparative science of cognition have a 
cultural mission. 
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science on its (cultural) environment (see Fleck [1939] 2011a, 327-328), Fleck goes on to 
emphasize that this dependence should lead us to fruitful investigations instead of 
skepticism about science:  
 
This phenomenon of dependence of the scientific object from its epoch 
and environment […] needs to be utilized for cognition. It has to be 
grasped such that it has a heuristic—not a skeptical—value; such that it is 
the starting point for fruitful investigations and not the source of 
superficial phrases about the non-existence of a ‘presuppositionless 
science’ or melancholic reflections about the ‘insecurity of every human 
knowledge’ (Fleck [1939] 2011a, 328f).  
 
Fleck describes the current situation as ambivalent because the insight in the dependence 
of science on the environment opens up different possibilities to react on it: the more 
conservative scholars (Gelehrten) frightfully close their eyes to this fact of environmental 
dependence, whereas “clever politicians quickly convert the glimpsed information into 
demagogic slogans” (Fleck [1939] 2011a, 329). This latter strategy leads to the idea of 
changing science according to political ideas: “Since every knowledge is dependent on 
the environment, the process must be turned around: a suitable science must be produced 
for the artificially changed environment. Because there is no objective science anyway! 
Therefore a left or right, proletarian or national physics, chemistry etc. must be quickly 
‘made up’.” (Fleck [1939] 2011a, 329).  
 
For Fleck, these latter tendencies are very dangerous, because “the generation of future 
scientists grows up with the belief that there is no truth in the good old sense of the 
discipline anymore.” (Fleck [1939] 2011a, 329). How can we, according to Fleck, avoid 
these dangerous tendencies and use the insight in the dependence of science on the 
environment in a more fruitful way? Fleck’s answer is clear: what is needed is to end any 
intuitive speculations about science’s dependence but start to investigate the dependence 
of science on the environment scientifically: “But such a—more artistic and literary than 
scientific—approach, which has been mainly pursued by the authors and which depends 
on the intuitive feeling of similarities […] and connections […] is not appropriate for 
research.” [Fleck [1939] 2011a, 330).  
 
What is this science that leads to a much better understanding of the link between science 
and environment and, in this way, protects science from political propaganda? It is the 
sociology of cognition and Fleck’s own comparative science of thought-styles that has 
this enlightening function: “Therefore, it seems to me that the starting point for positive 
research on the influence of the epoch on science can only be the general sociology of 
cognition. This necessarily leads to the concepts of thought-collective and thought-style 
[…].” (Fleck [1939] 2011a, 331).  
 
Fleck unambiguously makes clear that it is such a science of cognition that will be the 
barrier against ideological intrusions on science in times in which the insight that science 
itself is dependent on the environment becomes more and more obvious:  
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Artistic impressions, intuitive conjectures and subjective empathy can in 
this way be transformed into relations that can be deduced (herleiten) 
from the independent laws of the sociology of cognition and the 
development of thinking. We avoid to fall for a fruitless doctrine of 
ideology and receive a science of cognition that is capable of development 
and rich in detail (Fleck [1939] 2011a, 331).  
 
At the end of Science and Environment Fleck takes up this thought and again emphasizes 
the way out of the “ideological crisis and demoralization of experts” (Fleck [1939] 2011a, 
334): what is needed is a “thorough science of knowledge” (Fleck [1939] 2011a, 334). 
Therefore, in a nutshell, Fleck’s direct argument against the danger of the intrusion of 
political or ideological elements in the realm of science is obviously scientistic: what is 
needed is a science of knowledge and this science is his comparative, social 
epistemology. Such a scientific epistemology will have an enlightening effect by 
detecting the independent laws of the sociology of cognition and therefore provide means 
against propaganda and the danger that future scientists do not believe any longer in 
science’s authoritative status.9 I do not see any transcendental argument here but only the 
application of Fleck’s scientistic optimism. 
 
Would Fleck Accept His Scientism? 
 
Let me end my discussion of Fleck’s argument in Science and Environment by remarking 
two things: first of all, note that my interpretation along scientistic lines very well fits 
with Fleck’s conviction—also mentioned by Ginev (see Ginev 2015, 5)—that the 
thought-style of natural science is democratic. However, I will focus not—like Ginev—
on Fleck’s remarks about the structure of the natural scientific thought-collective with 
respect to the relation between mass and elite but on the following remark:  
 
[E]very scientist has the obligation to remain in the background. This 
obligation is also expressed in the democratically equal regard for 
anybody that acquires knowledge. All research workers, as a matter of 
principle, are regarded as possessing equal rights. And all, in the service 
of the common ideal, must equally withdraw their own individuality into 
the shadows, as it were. Personal supposition in science is regarded as 
provisional; this is a specific structural aspect of the thought collective of 
science (Fleck 1979, 144).10  
 
Fleck’s scientism should be understood in just this way that by a scientific investigation 
and comparison of thought-styles the suppositions of the natural-scientific thought-
collective are at work also in reflection about science itself. In contrast to speculative, 
intuitive remarks about the relation between science and environment the scientific 
investigation of this relation embodies the ideal of “truth in the good old sense” (Fleck 
                                            
9 This idea is prevalent also in Fleck’s later writings: see Fn. 7 in this paper. 
10 These remarks are similar to Robert Merton’s remarks about the norm of universalism in his seminal 
work on the ethos of science: see Merton 1973, 273. 
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[1939] 2011a, 329) as being independent of personal and speculative influences.11 This 
ideal itself leads to a “democratically equal regard for anybody that acquires knowledge” 
(Fleck 1979, 144). Note, that such an idea is foreign to just those thought-collectives that 
with respect to its dependence on the opinion of the mass appear to provide better means 
to ward off external influences: religious thought-collectives. Therefore, on my scientistic 
interpretation it is possible to explain away the problem  
 
Ginev’s interpretation is confronted with: if just seen from the point of view of the 
relation between mass and elite it appears that scientific thought-collectives are more 
prone to ideological intrusions than religious ones; if seen, however, from the angle of an 
impersonal ideal of truth that is an integral part of the natural scientific thought-style it is 
no wonder that Fleck in demanding a science of cognition sees science as the best means 
against political ideologization and propaganda. In this sense, the scientific investigation 
of the dependence of science on the environment can provide the scientist with means to 
protect science’s ideal of truth from political intrusions since this ideal itself demands a 
democratic constitution of the thought-collective of science. 
 
Secondly, what would Fleck say about my and Ginev’s differing interpretations? An 
answer, of course would be highly speculative and I do not aim to give one her. However, 
this question provides the opportunity to go a bit beyond Fleck’s text Science and 
Environment and have a look at the other texts that can be seen to be part of his debate 
with Tadeusz Bilikiewicz. I just want to make some short remarks in this context. Note 
that Bilikiewicz thinks that he can detect in Fleck’s thought “the echo of a transcendental 
idealism” (Bilikiewicz [1939] 2011, 341) but also claims “that Fleck never stops being a 
natural scientist” (Bilikiewicz [1939] 2011, 350) and accuses him of scientism in the 
sense that he aims to investigate the relation between science and environment itself with 
the “natural scientific method” (Bilikiewicz [1939] 2011, 349).  
 
What is Fleck’s answer to these two aspects—transcendental idealism and scientism—of 
Bilikiewicz interpretation? Well, Fleck makes unambiguously clear that he takes 
Bilikiewicz interpretation along the lines of introducing a transcendental thing-in-itself to 
be nothing but metaphysics. And “nothing is more alien to me than metaphysics” (Fleck 
[1939] 2011b, 353). However, in his answer Fleck nowhere distances himself from 
Bilikiewicz accusation of an unacceptable methodological scientism! As already said, I 
do not want to take this fact as evidence that Fleck would not object to my scientistic 
interpretation of his work and strongly reject Ginev’s interpretation.12 Nevertheless, it 
                                            
11 It is important to note that this is the ideal of truth as independent of personal and speculative influences 
not the ideal of truth as independent of sociological and historical influences: it is exactly the latter that 
Fleck’s comparative science of thought-styles aims to illuminate by detecting the independent laws at work. 
12 To be sure, Ginev distinguishes between three sorts of transcendental approach of which probably only 
the first can be subsumed to Bilikiewicz’ interpretation. And since Ginev sees Fleck’s approach as a 
combination of the second and third approach (see Ginev 2015, 3), Bilikiewicz’ interpretation of Fleck as a 
transcendental idealist is prima facie remote from Ginev’s interpretation. 
Note however the following: a short look at Fleck’s rejoinder to Bilikiewicz makes it clear that Fleck 
ardently rejects any metaphysical and ontological speculations in his thought. I have to admit that I am not 
sure whether Fleck will therefore easily admit Ginev’s description of the second approach that, according to 
Ginev is supposed to be at the center of Fleck’s alleged transcendental arguments and that Ginev describes 
as follows: “Devising the hermeneutic circle of being-in-the-world in this manner amounts to thinking the 
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seems to me that my interpretation is more easily compatible with Fleck’s hostility 
against any kind of speculative, intuitive philosophical reflection than Ginev’s. 
 
Let me make one final remark to understand more fully the impact of my argument. 
Perhaps, the reader of this comment might be surprised that I did not directly commented 
on Ginev’s short criticism of my attempt to connect Fleck’s and Mannheim’s approach to 
the relativism problem (see Seidel 2011). But note that I have done indirectly during this 
comment. Ginev is convinced that my (and also Zittel’s13) interpretation of Fleck is 
wrong since it aims to unduly read Fleck from the perspective of standpoint epistemology 
(see Ginev 2015, 11-13). He argues that: 
 
 [W]hat this perspective misses to take into consideration is the open 
horizon of possibilities that always transcends each particular kind of 
knowledge production’s situatedness. […] On this account, the ‘objective 
truth’ is still statically defined by attributing it to the epistemic position 
distinguished by highest critical reflexivity and capacity to maximize 
objectivity. By contrast, Fleck stresses the priority of the ‘event of truth’ 
over the statically defined objective truth. His concept of ‘creative human 
truth’ is not epistemological at all. […] Thus considered, truth is an ‘event 
in the history of thought’, and not a relation between an epistemic position 
and reality out there (as this relation gets devised by the proponents of 
‘standpoint epistemologies’) (Ginev 2015 12f.).  
 
This difference is the basis of Ginev’s argument against my interpretation since, 
according to Ginev, the difference between Mannheim, whom he reads as a proponent of 
standpoint epistemology, and Fleck “has to be conceived as a matter of principle” (Ginev 
2015, 16 Fn. 17). I do not want to dwell on the fact that Ginev’s description of what he 
regards as ‘standpoint epistemologies’ is quite simplistic,14 and also not on the fact that I 
explicitly discuss Fleck’s and Mannheim’s idea of dynamic and not statically defined 
truth at length in my paper and that this is one of my main arguments to see both authors 
in the same boat (see Seidel 2011, 224-227). What I want to emphasize, however, is that 
my and also Zittel’s brilliant interpretation stems from a specific problem in Fleck-
interpretation: namely, the tension between Fleck’s rejection of the “excessive respect, 
bordering on pious reverence, for scientific facts” (Fleck 1979, 47) that he thinks 
mistakenly characterizes previous sociology of knowledge on the one hand and his 
endorsement of scientism in reflecting on science and his high esteem of scientific 
investigations in sociology of knowledge itself on the other hand.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
‘ontological difference’ as providing the conditions under which the ‘meaning of being’ (the ontological 
meaning) can be specified as ‘ontic meaning’ of particular entities within-the-world. Thus, transcendental 
epistemology becomes transformed into a kind of ‘transcendental ontology’.” (Ginev 2015, 2). But, I admit, 
probably my puzzlement mainly stems from the fact that I simply do not understand this description of the 
second sort of transcendental approach. 
13 See Zittel 2010. 
14 Note that I do not aim to defend the programme of ‘standpoint epistemologies’ in Ginev’s sense (he 
mentions Harding and the Strong programme) by this remark: see for a detailed criticism of the Strong 
programme my Seidel 2014. 
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Seen from this point of view my reply to Ginev directly answers his criticism of my 
former paper: of course, if one drops completely Fleck’s scientism that is prevalent in his 
whole work, there is the possibility not to interpret Fleck in line with the tradition of 
standpoint epistemology in sociology of knowledge that—with its obvious scientism in 
the tradition Ginev mentions—has exactly the same problem as just described.15 But this 
is just to overlook an integral part of Fleck’s whole project—namely his engrained 
scientism with respect to epistemological and philosophical investigations. 
 
Contact details: maseidel@hotmail.com 
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